# Generic Technical Agreements (generieke bouwblokken) # Identifying health organizations
Version2025-07-04
Statusdraft
## Introduction This techincal agreements descibes how health organizations should be identified in the context of data exchanges. ## Agreements ### Decision Health organizations are identfied using URA-number (UZI-Register Abonneenummer) ### Rationale 1. Conform to nation information model for health orgnizations (Zorginformatiebouwsteen Zorgaanbieder: https://zibs.nl/wiki/Zorgaanbieder-v3.6(2024NL)) 2. The URA-number is issued by a public organization (CIBG) 3. The URA-number is cryptographically verifiable because it is contained in a PKI-certificate (UZI-servercertificaat, CPS: https://www.uziregister.nl/over-het-register/certificeringsbeleid/archief-certification-practice-statement) # Identifying vendor organizations
Version2025-07-04
Statusdraft
## Introduction This techincal agreements descibes how vendor organizations should be identified in the context of data exchanges. ## Agreements ### Decision Vendor organizations are identfied using KvK-number (Kamer van Koophandel nummer, in English: Chamber of Commerce number) ### Rationale 1. The KvK-number is issued by a public organization (KvK 2. The KvK-number is cryptographically verifiable because it is contained in a PKI-certificate (PKIoverheid-certificate, CPS: https://cps.pkioverheid.nl) # Identifying professionals
Version2025-07-04
Statusdraft
## Introduction This techincal agreements descibes how professionals should be identified in the context of data exchanges. ## Agreements ### Decision 1 Professionals are identfied using local employee number ### Rationale 1. All professionals have a local employee number 2. A national healthcare professional number ("zorgverlener-id") is not yet available for all professionals ### Decision 2 When a Dezi-number is available, that number is used for identification. ### Rationale 1. A national number makes it easeier to cross-organizationally identify professionals. # Authenticating health organizations
Version2025-07-04
Statusdraft
## Introduction This technical agreement descibes how health organizations should be authenticated in the context of data exchanges. ## Agreements ### Decision Health organizations are authenticated using a X509credential based on a UZI-servercertificate. ### Rationale 1. UZI-servercertificate is issued by a public organization (CIBG) 2. URA-number is contained as attribute in the UZI-servercertificaat, CPS: https://www.uziregister.nl/over-het-register/certificeringsbeleid/archief-certification-practice-statement 3. The URA-number can securely be contained in a X509credential using the open source software [did:x509 and X509Credential Toolkit](https://wiki.nuts.nl/books/x509credential) # Authenticating vendor organisations
Version2025-07-04
Statusdraft
## Introduction This technical agreement descibes how vendor organizations should be authenticated in the context of data exchanges. ## Agreements ### Decision Vendor organizations are authenticated on the network level using server- and client-authentication (mutual TLS) based on PKIoverheid-certificates. ### Rationale 1. PKIoverheid-certificate is a national standard 2. All vendor organizations can obtain a PKIoverheid certificate, as long as they are subscribed in the Dutch Chamber of Commerce (KvK). 3. Vendor organizations can choose from several service suppliers to obtain a PKIoverheid-certificate 4. The PKIoverheid-certificate makes the KvK-number (see [Identifying vendor organisations](https://wiki.nuts.nl/books/generic-technical-agreements-generieke-bouwblokken/page/identifying-vendor-organizations)) cryptographically verifiable because it is contained in the PKIoverheid-certificates as attribute `RelativeDistinguishedName.organizationIdentifier` (see section 3.1.4 of CPS: https://cps.pkioverheid.nl). # Authenticating professionals
Version2025-07-04
Statusdraft
## Introduction This technical agreement descibes how professionals should be authenticated in the context of data exchanges. ## Agreements ### Decision 1 Professionals are "authenticated" (it is probably better ot refer to this solution as "federating the identity of the professional") using a [NutsEmployeeCredential](https://wiki.nuts.nl/books/authenticatie/page/proposal-for-employeeidentity-means) when cross-organizational authentication by Dezi is not in place. ### Rationale 1. NutsEmployeeCredential can be used now and is not dependent of other (national) initiatives ### Decision 1 When cross-organizational authentication by Dezi is in place, professionals are authenticated using Dezi. ### Rationale 1. t.b.d. # Localisation to do # Addressing to do # Authorizing incoming requests
Version2025-07-04
Statusdraft
## Introduction This technical agreement descibes how incoming requests must be authorized in the context of data exchanges. ## Agreements ### Decision 1 Authorization rules are technically defined using access policies written in Rego. ### Rationale 1. Rego makes access policies readable for both humans and machines. ### Decision 2 Parties are free to choose their own way to implement a Policy Decision Point (PDP). ### Rationale 1. Open source software for implementing a PDP is available (PDP) but parties are free to implement access policies in another way. # Local explicit consent
Version2025-07-04
Statusdraft
## Introduction This technical agreements descibes the needed technical agreements for the use of local explicit consent by data holders. ## Agreements ### Decision 1 Data holders are free to implement local explicit consent in a way that fits them, as long as the contents of the local explicit consent can be used when authorizing incoming requests. ### Rationale 1. to do ### Decision 2 Local explicit consent can be specific or categoral. ### Rationale 1. to do