# Generic Technical Agreements (generieke bouwblokken)
# Identifying health organizations
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Version | 2025-07-04 |
Status | draft |
## Introduction
This techincal agreements descibes how health organizations should be identified in the context of data exchanges.
## Agreements
### Decision
Health organizations are identfied using URA-number (UZI-Register Abonneenummer)
### Rationale
1. Conform to nation information model for health orgnizations (Zorginformatiebouwsteen Zorgaanbieder: https://zibs.nl/wiki/Zorgaanbieder-v3.6(2024NL))
2. The URA-number is issued by a public organization (CIBG)
3. The URA-number is cryptographically verifiable because it is contained in a PKI-certificate (UZI-servercertificaat, CPS: https://www.uziregister.nl/over-het-register/certificeringsbeleid/archief-certification-practice-statement)
# Identifying vendor organizations
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Version | 2025-07-04 |
Status | draft |
## Introduction
This techincal agreements descibes how vendor organizations should be identified in the context of data exchanges.
## Agreements
### Decision
Vendor organizations are identfied using KvK-number (Kamer van Koophandel nummer, in English: Chamber of Commerce number)
### Rationale
1. The KvK-number is issued by a public organization (KvK
2. The KvK-number is cryptographically verifiable because it is contained in a PKI-certificate (PKIoverheid-certificate, CPS: https://cps.pkioverheid.nl)
# Identifying professionals
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Version | 2025-07-04 |
Status | draft |
## Introduction
This techincal agreements descibes how professionals should be identified in the context of data exchanges.
## Agreements
### Decision 1
Professionals are identfied using local employee number
### Rationale
1. All professionals have a local employee number
2. A national healthcare professional number ("zorgverlener-id") is not yet available for all professionals
### Decision 2
When a Dezi-number is available, that number is used for identification.
### Rationale
1. A national number makes it easeier to cross-organizationally identify professionals.
# Authenticating health organizations
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Version | 2025-07-04 |
Status | draft |
## Introduction
This technical agreement descibes how health organizations should be authenticated in the context of data exchanges.
## Agreements
### Decision
Health organizations are authenticated using a X509credential based on a UZI-servercertificate.
### Rationale
1. UZI-servercertificate is issued by a public organization (CIBG)
2. URA-number is contained as attribute in the UZI-servercertificaat, CPS: https://www.uziregister.nl/over-het-register/certificeringsbeleid/archief-certification-practice-statement
3. The URA-number can securely be contained in a X509credential using the open source software [did:x509 and X509Credential Toolkit](https://wiki.nuts.nl/books/x509credential)
# Authenticating vendor organisations
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Version | 2025-07-04 |
Status | draft |
## Introduction
This technical agreement descibes how vendor organizations should be authenticated in the context of data exchanges.
## Agreements
### Decision
Vendor organizations are authenticated on the network level using server- and client-authentication (mutual TLS) based on PKIoverheid-certificates.
### Rationale
1. PKIoverheid-certificate is a national standard
2. All vendor organizations can obtain a PKIoverheid certificate, as long as they are subscribed in the Dutch Chamber of Commerce (KvK).
3. Vendor organizations can choose from several service suppliers to obtain a PKIoverheid-certificate
4. The PKIoverheid-certificate makes the KvK-number (see [Identifying vendor organisations](https://wiki.nuts.nl/books/generic-technical-agreements-generieke-bouwblokken/page/identifying-vendor-organizations)) cryptographically verifiable because it is contained in the PKIoverheid-certificates as attribute `RelativeDistinguishedName.organizationIdentifier` (see section 3.1.4 of CPS: https://cps.pkioverheid.nl).
# Authenticating professionals
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Version | 2025-07-04 |
Status | draft |
## Introduction
This technical agreement descibes how professionals should be authenticated in the context of data exchanges.
## Agreements
### Decision 1
Professionals are "authenticated" (it is probably better ot refer to this solution as "federating the identity of the professional") using a [NutsEmployeeCredential](https://wiki.nuts.nl/books/authenticatie/page/proposal-for-employeeidentity-means) when cross-organizational authentication by Dezi is not in place.
### Rationale
1. NutsEmployeeCredential can be used now and is not dependent of other (national) initiatives
### Decision 1
When cross-organizational authentication by Dezi is in place, professionals are authenticated using Dezi.
### Rationale
1. t.b.d.
# Localisation
to do
# Addressing
to do
# Authorizing incoming requests
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Version | 2025-07-04 |
Status | draft |
## Introduction
This technical agreement descibes how incoming requests must be authorized in the context of data exchanges.
## Agreements
### Decision 1
Authorization rules are technically defined using access policies written in Rego.
### Rationale
1. Rego makes access policies readable for both humans and machines.
### Decision 2
Parties are free to choose their own way to implement a Policy Decision Point (PDP).
### Rationale
1. Open source software for implementing a PDP is available (PDP) but parties are free to implement access policies in another way.
# Local explicit consent
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Version | 2025-07-04 |
Status | draft |
## Introduction
This technical agreements descibes the needed technical agreements for the use of local explicit consent by data holders.
## Agreements
### Decision 1
Data holders are free to implement local explicit consent in a way that fits them, as long as the contents of the local explicit consent can be used when authorizing incoming requests.
### Rationale
1. to do
### Decision 2
Local explicit consent can be specific or categoral.
### Rationale
1. to do